Guy v. State

Summary

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Tyrone Guy’s motion for postconviction relief. The court held that Guy’s claim concerning an accomplice-testimony jury instruction was previously adjudicated and procedurally barred, and that the modified instruction announced in Brooks v. State did not apply retroactively. The court further held that Guy’s ineffective-assistance claim against postconviction counsel was not barred under Rule 61(i)(2), but was untimely under the applicable one-year limitation period and was conclusory.

Holdings

1. Guy's claim that the trial court should have given a modified Bland accomplice-testimony instruction was procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) because the issue had already been considered and rejected on direct appeal.
2. Guy's ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claim was not barred under Rule 61(i)(2) because he had no prior opportunity to challenge the effectiveness of counsel who continued to represent him through the prior postconviction proceeding and appeal.
3. A claim that appointed postconviction counsel was constitutionally ineffective must be filed within one year after the defendant's first postconviction proceeding concludes, or, if no appeal is taken, within 30 days after the Superior Court denies the first postconviction motion.
4. Guy's ineffective-assistance claims were too conclusory to overcome the applicable procedural hurdle under Rule 61(i)(5).

Questions Presented

1. Whether Guy's challenge to the trial court's failure to give a modified Bland accomplice-testimony instruction was barred because it had been previously adjudicated under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4), and whether Brooks v. State created a retroactively applicable right warranting reconsideration.
2. Whether Guy's claim that his first postconviction counsel was ineffective was barred under Rule 61(i)(2), even though the same counsel represented him in the prior postconviction proceedings and appeal.
3. When the one-year limitations period under Rule 61(i)(1) begins to run for a claim that appointed postconviction counsel was constitutionally ineffective.

Disposition

affirmed