William C. Peay v. United States

924 A.2d 1023 (D.C. 2007) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 17, 2007 · No. No. 05-CF-898

Summary

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the defendant's four assault-with-a-deadly-weapon convictions merged and remanded for the trial court to vacate the merging convictions. The court also held that the indictment's failure to allege property value constructively amended the indictment when the defendant was tried for felony destruction of property, but the error did not constitute plain error warranting reversal because the defendant had notice of the felony charge and the evidence established the required property value. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

Holdings

  1. The four ADW convictions merge, and the trial court must vacate the convictions that merge.
  2. The evidence of two collisions and the related unanimity instruction did not constructively amend the indictment because the indictment generally alleged damage to a particular automobile on a particular date and did not limit the charge to a specific collision or location.
  3. The indictment was legally insufficient to charge felony destruction of property because it omitted the value of the damaged property, an element distinguishing the felony from the misdemeanor; permitting the jury to consider the felony therefore constructively amended the indictment.
  4. The error in treating the indictment as charging felony destruction of property was plain and affected substantial rights, but it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; therefore, reversal was not warranted.
  5. When one charge encompasses two separate incidents, the jury must be instructed to agree unanimously on the incident or incidents supporting a guilty verdict.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Peay's four assault-with-a-deadly-weapon convictions merged.
  2. Whether evidence concerning two collisions and a related unanimity instruction constructively amended the destruction-of-property indictment or created a prejudicial variance.
  3. Whether an indictment that alleged destruction of an automobile but omitted the property's value supported a felony destruction-of-property conviction.
  4. Whether the unpreserved indictment omission constituted plain error requiring reversal.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (18)

  • Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 388 (D.C. 2000)(followed)
  • Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1005 (D.C. 1991)(followed)
  • Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 997, 1000 n. 7 (D.C. 2005)(followed)
  • Carter v. United States, 826 A.2d 300, 303, 304, 306 (D.C. 2003)(followed)
  • Zacarias v. United States, 884 A.2d 83, 87 (D.C. 2005)(followed)
  • United States v. Bradford, 482 A.2d 430, 432 (D.C. 1984)(followed)
  • Wittenberg v. United States, 366 A.2d 128, 132 (D.C. 1976)(followed)
  • Johnson v. United States, 812 A.2d 234, 241-242 (D.C. 2002)(followed)
  • Smith v. United States, 801 A.2d 958, 962 (D.C. 2002)(followed)
  • United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)(followed)

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