In re Matthew Kluger

Summary

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is a crime involving moral turpitude per se. Because Matthew Kluger was convicted of that offense, along with related securities-fraud and money-laundering offenses, the court accepted the Board on Professional Responsibility's recommendation and disbarred him. The disbarment period was ordered to run from the date he filed the required affidavit.

Holdings

1. Obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is a crime of moral turpitude per se because every conviction under that provision necessarily involves conduct that disregards the system of law and due process and is materially equivalent to obstruction offenses previously held to involve moral turpitude per se.
2. A member of the District of Columbia Bar convicted of a crime of moral turpitude must be disbarred; because Kluger's § 1512(c)(2) conviction was a crime of moral turpitude per se, disbarment was required.

Questions Presented

1. Whether obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is a crime of moral turpitude per se under District of Columbia law.
2. Whether Kluger must be disbarred under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) because of that conviction.

Disposition

other