In re Wendell Macklin

Summary

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered whether a criminal defendant found unlikely to regain competency could be detained in an inpatient treatment facility pending completion of civil-commitment proceedings. The court held that such detention was authorized under the interaction of the Incompetent Defendants Criminal Commitment Act and the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, despite statutory language referring to prior emergency detention. The court treated that language as an apparent drafting error and reversed the trial court’s order requiring release; the appeal was technically moot but presented an issue capable of repetition yet evading review.

Holdings

1. The court exercised its discretion to decide the otherwise moot appeal because it presented an important and recurring issue of law that would otherwise tend to evade review.
2. A defendant found unlikely to regain competence and detained under D.C. Code § 24-531.07(c)(1) may be detained pending completion of civil-commitment proceedings even if the defendant was not previously hospitalized on an emergency basis, provided the requisite findings under D.C. Code § 24-531.07(c)(2), including §§ 21-524 and 21-525, or under § 21-526(d), have been made.
3. The court did not reach whether the Commission's failure to make an explicit least-restrictive-alternative finding independently required release because Macklin did not raise that issue and the challenged order no longer had practical effect.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a defendant found incompetent and unlikely to regain competence, released in the criminal case, and remanded to an inpatient treatment facility under D.C. Code § 24-531.07(c)(1) may be detained pending completion of civil-commitment proceedings when the Commission on Mental Health finds that inpatient commitment is the least restrictive alternative to prevent self-injury or injury to others.
2. Whether such continued detention requires that emergency involuntary hospitalization proceedings have first been initiated under the Ervin Act.
3. Whether the appeal should be decided despite becoming moot after entry of a final civil-commitment order.

Disposition

reversed