Winkler v. Moore

Summary

The Florida Supreme Court consolidated petitions for writs of habeas corpus by Mark D. Winkler and Christopher Hall and a petition for writ of mandamus by James Cross. The court denied Winkler's and Hall's petitions, concluding they were not entitled to additional overcrowding gain-time credits, and granted Cross limited mandamus relief by ordering additional credits for certain offenses. The opinion addresses ex post facto and due process claims, statutory eligibility for emergency gain time, administrative gain time, and provisional credits, and disciplinary-infraction-based eligibility rules.

Holdings

1. A Group 1 offender is not entitled under ex post facto principles to overcrowding credits that were awarded under later statutes when the offender had no entitlement to those credits under the statute in effect on the date of the offense.
2. Group 1 offenders were not entitled to restoration of the disputed overcrowding credits under the Due Process Clause.
3. Hall was entitled to no more than 330 days of emergency gain time because he qualified only for Phase I awards and did not satisfy the requirements for Phase II awards.
4. Under the Department rules applicable to Cross, one month of disciplinary misconduct could result in only one month of gain-time ineligibility, not two months.
5. For purposes of the established inmate-credit calculations, the Court would treat the first overcrowding statute as effective June 15, 1983, although it legally became effective when filed with the Secretary of State on June 16, 1983.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Group 1 offenders, including Winkler, were entitled under the Ex Post Facto or Due Process Clauses to restoration of overcrowding credits that they had received under later-enacted statutes but would not have been entitled to receive under the statute in effect when they committed their offenses.
2. Whether Hall, a Group 2 offender, was entitled to more than 330 days of emergency gain time under the first version of the emergency gain-time statute.
3. Whether the Department properly denied Cross overcrowding credits for two months for each month in which he committed a disciplinary infraction.
4. Whether the first overcrowding statute should be treated as effective June 15, 1983, rather than June 16, 1983, for purposes of calculating inmate credits.

Disposition

writ_granted