Spencer v. State

Summary

The Supreme Court of Florida reviews the denial of Dusty Ray Spencer’s motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and his petition for habeas corpus. The court rejects claims involving prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, Brady and Giglio violations, juror bias, and constitutional challenges to Florida’s death-penalty statute. It affirms the denial of postconviction relief and denies habeas relief.

Holdings

1. Claims based on matters appearing on the trial record that were or could have been litigated at trial and on direct appeal are procedurally barred in a collateral postconviction proceeding.
2. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must prove both deficient performance and a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency, the result would have been different; Spencer failed to establish either prong for the asserted guilt- and penalty-phase deficiencies.
3. Expert evidence of diminished capacity is inadmissible to establish lack of mens rea, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to present the proposed dissociative-state evidence during the guilt phase.
4. No Brady violation occurred because the reserve deputy's identity was disclosed and the deputy did not possess favorable, suppressed evidence.
5. A Rule 3.850 claim may be summarily denied when the motion, files, and records conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief; the court must state its rationale or attach the record portions refuting the claim.
6. The prosecutor's challenged opening and closing arguments did not establish Giglio violations because the record did not show knowingly false material statements and the challenged arguments either had evidentiary support or accurately characterized the evidence.
7. Spencer was not entitled to relief under Apprendi or Ring, and the prior remand did not require impaneling a new jury because this Court expressly remanded for reconsideration and reweighing by the judge.
8. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless, unpreserved, previously rejected, or nonfundamental claims; any prosecutorial comment concerning Spencer's unsworn statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Spencer's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were procedurally barred because they were or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.
2. Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt and penalty phases under Strickland v. Washington.
3. Whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the involvement of a reserve deputy sheriff.
4. Whether pretrial publicity, juror contacts, and alleged juror bias denied Spencer a fair trial or supported ineffective-assistance claims.
5. Whether the circuit court improperly summarily denied additional Rule 3.850 claims without an evidentiary hearing.
6. Whether the State committed Giglio violations by misstating evidence during opening or closing argument.
7. Whether Florida Bar Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) was unconstitutional or impaired Spencer's postconviction proceedings.
8. Whether cumulative trial errors warranted postconviction relief.
9. Whether Florida's capital-sentencing scheme was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona.
10. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise prosecutorial-misconduct and other claims as fundamental error.

Disposition

affirmed