Diaz v. State

Summary

The Supreme Court of Florida reviews Angel Nieves Diaz’s successive motions for postconviction relief, requests for public records, and petitions for habeas corpus and other extraordinary writs in connection with his scheduled execution. The court rejects challenges to Florida’s lethal-injection statute and procedures, claims based on newly discovered evidence, and the public-records requests, affirming the trial court and denying the requested writ relief.

Holdings

1. Florida's lethal-injection statute is not an improper delegation of legislative power merely because it authorizes the Department of Corrections to determine the execution methodology and chemicals used.
2. Section 922.105(7), Florida Statutes, does not give the Department of Corrections unfettered discretion by exempting lethal-injection procedures from chapter 120 administrative proceedings.
3. Diaz did not establish that Florida's lethal-injection statute or protocol violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the asserted new materials did not require reconsideration or an evidentiary hearing.
4. A successive postconviction claim based on newly discovered evidence requires evidence unknown at trial and undiscoverable through due diligence, together with evidence probably producing an acquittal or less severe sentence.
5. Florida law does not recognize mental illness as a per se bar to execution, and Diaz failed to show that he met the legal standard for insanity at execution.
6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz's public-records requests because they were overbroad, unduly burdensome, insufficiently related to a colorable postconviction claim, or unlikely to lead to admissible evidence.
7. Diaz's proportionality claim was procedurally barred because it had been raised and rejected on direct appeal, and the Gajus affidavit did not provide a basis to reconsider the sentence.
8. Diaz was not entitled to habeas relief because the challenged testimony did not present a Crawford violation; alternatively, any possible violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
9. Section 27.702 was not unconstitutional, and Diaz's due process rights were not violated because he had an alternative avenue to challenge lethal injection in federal court.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Florida's lethal-injection statute improperly delegated legislative authority to the Department of Corrections or unlawfully exempted execution procedures from the Administrative Procedure Act.
2. Whether Florida's lethal-injection statute or protocol constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Florida and United States Constitutions.
3. Whether the American Bar Association report, the Weisman letter, materials from Morales v. Hickman, or the Gajus affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence requiring relief or an evidentiary hearing.
4. Whether Diaz's alleged mental illness exempted him from execution.
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Diaz's requests for public records.
6. Whether Diaz's death sentence was disproportionate compared with his codefendant's life sentence.
7. Whether admission of testimony concerning Diaz's prior conviction violated Crawford v. Washington.
8. Whether section 27.702, Florida Statutes, violated due process by limiting Capital Collateral Regional Counsel to statutorily authorized collateral actions.

Disposition

affirmed