Steven Richard Taylor v. State of Florida; Steven Richard Taylor v. Walter A. McNeil

Summary

The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of Steven Richard Taylor’s amended motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court rejected claims involving amendment of the postconviction pleadings, ineffective assistance of trial counsel concerning DNA evidence and other trial issues, and alleged Brady and Giglio violations.

Holdings

1. Because Taylor's initial shell motion was filed before October 1, 2001, and remained pending on that date, his amended postconviction motion was governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 rather than Rule 3.851.
2. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor's motion to amend because the arguments in the closing memorandum merely refined and expanded claims already presented, and the court addressed the claims as they would have appeared in the amended motion.
3. Taylor failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland for his claims concerning DNA evidence, the continuance, a Richardson hearing, the purported white blouse, or prosecutorial comments.
4. Taylor failed to establish a Brady or Giglio violation based on the alleged late or incomplete disclosure of DNA protocols, reports, bench notes, or Shirley Zeigler's identity.
5. Taylor was not entitled to a new trial because the postconviction court found his former cellmate's recanted testimony not credible.
6. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court should have ordered a Frye hearing sua sponte or for failing to challenge the presumption-of-innocence comments and jury instruction.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Taylor's postconviction motion was governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 or Rule 3.851.
2. Whether the postconviction court abused its discretion by striking portions of Taylor's closing memorandum and denying his motion to amend.
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to request a Frye hearing, object to or present expert testimony concerning DNA evidence, pursue a continuance, request a Richardson hearing, investigate a purported second blouse, or object to prosecutorial comments.
4. Whether alleged nondisclosure of DNA protocols, reports, bench notes, and the identity of Shirley Zeigler established Brady or Giglio violations.
5. Whether the recanted testimony of Taylor's former cellmate constituted newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.
6. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the absence of a sua sponte Frye hearing or prosecutorial comments and jury instructions concerning the presumption of innocence.

Disposition

affirmed