Herlinda S. Garza v. Claudia R. Saenz Hourigan and Esther A. Saenz Salmon as Former Trustee for Osbaldo A. Saenz Sr. and Maria Estela G. Saenz Trust, Carmela Criselda Saenz Perez and Cecilia Lisby Saenz Belmontez as Trustees for Osbaldo A. Saenz Sr. and Maria Estela G. Trust

No. 04-24-00739-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 17, 2026) · Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio · June 17, 2026 · No. 04-24-00739-CV

Summary

The Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed a final judgment granting Claudia R. Saenz Hourigan’s traditional motion for summary judgment and denying Herlinda S. Garza’s no-evidence motion. The court held that Garza waived her appellate complaints through inadequate briefing and, alternatively, failed to challenge the independent adverse-possession ground supporting the judgment.

Court
Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio
Writing for the Court
Adrian A. Spears II; Lori Massey Brissette; Velia J. Meza
Jurisdiction
Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio
Decision date
June 17, 2026
Docket number
04-24-00739-CV
Procedural posture
Garza appealed a final judgment denying her no-evidence motion for summary judgment and granting Hourigan's traditional cross-motion for summary judgment in a real-property and trust dispute.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the briefing under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 and applied the rule that an appellant must attack each independent ground supporting the judgment. It also liberally construed the pro se brief, while requiring compliance with applicable procedural rules.
Precedential value
Published memorandum opinion; no reporter citation appears in the source.
Parties
Herlinda S. Garza v. Claudia R. Saenz Hourigan, Esther A. Saenz Salmon, Carmela Criselda Saenz Perez, Cecilia Lisby Saenz Belmontez
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

appellate proceduresummary judgmentadverse possessiontrustsreal estate

Practice areas

appellate procedurecivil procedurereal estatetrusts

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Garza's pro se amended brief adequately presented appellate complaints under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1.
  2. Whether Garza waived appellate review by failing to challenge each independent ground supporting the summary judgment, including Hourigan's adverse-possession theory.
  3. Whether the trial court's judgment was final and appealable despite not expressly naming two unserved defendants.

Holdings

  1. The judgment was final and appealable because the record contained nothing indicating that Garza expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants.
  2. Garza waived her appellate complaints because her amended pro se brief failed to present a coherent argument, explain how the alleged errors related to the judgment, provide adequate record references, or otherwise comply with Rule 38.1.
  3. Any error in the trial court's inter vivos-transfer ground was harmless because Garza did not challenge Hourigan's independent adverse-possession ground, which fully supported the judgment.

Key quotations

There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves. (at 4)
The burden is on the appellant “to discuss [her] assertions of error, and we have no duty—or even right—to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.” (at 6)
Thus, we hold that Garza has waived her appellate complaints due to inadequate briefing and has presented nothing for our review. (at 6)

Factual background

The dispute concerned a one-fifth interest in real property formerly owned by the parties' mother. Hourigan asserted that she purchased the property from the trust while Esther Saenz Salmon was trustee and that the trust owned the property through an inter vivos transfer or adverse possession. Garza and Homero Saenz challenged Hourigan's ownership and alleged claims relating to heirship, the trust, and the transfer of the property, but Garza's appellate brief did not coherently connect those allegations to an error in the summary judgment.

Procedural history

Garza and Homero A. Saenz filed claims for trespass to try title and, alternatively, adverse possession. Hourigan asserted bona-fide-purchaser, adverse-possession, fraudulent-lien, slander-of-title, declaratory, injunctive, and attorney-fee claims, and moved for traditional summary judgment. The trial court denied Garza's no-evidence motion, granted Hourigan's traditional motion, declared Hourigan the rightful owner, and rendered a final judgment. Garza appealed pro se; the court of appeals struck her initial brief, accepted an amended but deficient brief, and affirmed after holding that her complaints were waived.

Court Document

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