Progressive Direct Insurance Company v. Christopher Marr

Summary

The Fourth Court of Appeals of San Antonio, Texas, reviewed the denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance in an underinsured motorist coverage dispute. The court held that Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general personal jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against Progressive Direct for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Holdings

1. Texas lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Progressive Direct because Progressive Direct did not purposefully direct relevant conduct toward Texas and the operative facts of Marr's claims concerned the formation and performance of an insurance policy issued outside Texas to a non-Texas resident, not the Texas automobile accident.
2. Texas lacked general personal jurisdiction over Progressive Direct because Progressive Direct was incorporated and headquartered in Ohio, did not maintain a registered agent in Texas, and had no contacts so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in Texas.
3. Progressive Direct's participation in unrelated Texas lawsuits did not establish either specific or general personal jurisdiction in Marr's action.
4. Even if Progressive Direct's minimum contacts were marginally sufficient, exercising jurisdiction in Texas would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
5. The trial court erred by denying Progressive Direct's special appearance; the appellate court reversed the order and rendered judgment dismissing Marr's claims against Progressive Direct for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Progressive Direct based on the Texas accident, the policy's coverage for out-of-state accidents, or Progressive Direct's alleged contacts with Texas.
2. Whether Texas had general personal jurisdiction over Progressive Direct based on its alleged continuous and systematic contacts with Texas.
3. Whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Progressive Direct would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
4. Whether Progressive Direct's special appearance should have been granted and the claims dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Disposition

reversed