Summary
The Supreme Court of Georgia addresses whether a tax deed holder's title ripened by prescription and whether the appellant properly redeemed the property. The court held that payment of taxes alone did not establish the adverse possession required for prescriptive title, but the appellant remained obligated to pay the correct redemption price. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Holdings
- A tax-deed grantee's title does not ripen by prescription merely through the passage of time or payment of property taxes; the grantee must establish the adverse possession required by OCGA §§ 48-4-48 and 44-5-161. Because Evans never occupied the property or engaged in acts evidencing possession or a claim of ownership, her title had not ripened by prescription.
- Evans waived the requirement that Mark Turner Properties make a formal tender before filing and prosecuting the redemption action because her refusal to identify the amount due and her failure to respond to repeated redemption efforts demonstrated that she would not accept payment.
- The inadequacy of Mark Turner Properties' deposit did not prevent it from redeeming the property because Evans had waived tender before prescriptive title could ripen, and the complaint's allegation that Mark Turner Properties was ready, willing, and able to pay the redemption price was sufficient.
- The redemption price included a 20-percent annual premium for each of four years, or fractions thereof, after the tax sale. The 1996 amendment increasing the premium from 10 percent to 20 percent was not unconstitutionally retroactive because the parties' property rights had not fully vested before the amendment's effective date.
Questions Presented
- Whether Evans's tax-deed title ripened by prescription and thereby barred Mark Turner Properties' right of redemption.
- Whether Evans waived the statutory tender requirement by refusing to state the amount she claimed was necessary for redemption and failing to respond to repeated redemption efforts.
- Whether Mark Turner Properties was required to deposit the entire redemption price into the court registry despite Evans's waiver of tender.
- Whether the 20-percent annual premium under the 1996 amendment to OCGA § 48-4-42 applied to the redemption calculation.
- Whether the redemption premium had to include the fourth year, or any fraction of that year, following the tax sale.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (14)
- Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 316 S.E.2d 537 (1984)(followed)
- Blizzard v. Moniz, 271 Ga. 50, 518 S.E.2d 407 (1999)(followed)
- Moultrie v. Wright, 266 Ga. 30, 464 S.E.2d 194 (1995)(distinguished)
- Machen v. Wolande Mgmt. Group, 271 Ga. 163, 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999)(followed)
- Talmadge v. Adams, 240 Ga. 193, 240 S.E.2d 9 (1977)(followed)
- Scott v. Cain, 90 Ga. 34, 15 S.E. 816 (1892)(followed)
- Crawley v. Selby, 208 Ga. 530, 67 S.E.2d 775 (1951)(followed)
- Coffey Enterprises Realty & Development Co. v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937, 213 S.E.2d 882 (1975)(followed)
- Stith v. Morris, 241 Ga. 247, 244 S.E.2d 817 (1978)(followed)
- Southerland v. Bradshaw, 255 Ga. 455, 339 S.E.2d 579 (1986)(followed)
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