Summary
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the State Board of Pardons and Paroles’ notice assigning an inmate a tentative parole month was not premature consideration for parole under OCGA § 42-9-45(b). Because the timing of parole consideration involved the Board’s discretion, mandamus was inappropriate, and the trial court’s judgment was reversed.
Holdings
- The Board's Notice of Tentative Action was not premature consideration for parole because applying the parole guidelines to determine a tentative parole month is not itself consideration for parole under OCGA § 42-9-45(b).
- Mandamus was inappropriate because Carthen could not show a clear legal duty requiring the Board to consider him for parole immediately upon statutory eligibility, and the timing of consideration was within the Board's discretion.
Questions Presented
- Whether the Board's notice assigning a tentative parole month constituted premature consideration for parole before Carthen became eligible under OCGA § 42-9-45(b).
- Whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy to compel the Board to consider Carthen for parole within 45 days.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (4)
- Daker v. Ray, 275 Ga. 205, 206, 563 S.E.2d 429 (2002)(followed)
- Forsyth County v. White, 272 Ga. 619(2), 532 S.E.2d 392 (2000)(followed)
- Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 273 Ga. 431(1), 543 S.E.2d 16 (2001)(followed)
- Ray v. Barber, 273 Ga. 856(2), 548 S.E.2d 283 (2001)(distinguished)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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