Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388

Summary

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed Larry Cobb's murder convictions after concluding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to timely object to hearsay testimony from a firearms expert. The court held that the testimony, based on information obtained from a holster manufacturer, was inadmissible and that its admission prejudiced Cobb because it was the only evidence linking him to a .45-caliber firearm. The court also addressed, for purposes of retrial, challenges concerning suppression of the holster and redaction of a misdemeanor concealed-weapon plea.

Holdings

1. Trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object when the firearms examiner first testified that a company representative had told her the holster was designed for a Colt .45 pistol.
2. Counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because there was a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different had the firearms testimony been excluded.
3. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the holster because such a motion would properly have been denied.
4. Counsel performed deficiently by failing to seek redaction of Cobb's misdemeanor concealed-weapons plea from evidence of his first-offender sentence.
5. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Cobb guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Questions Presented

1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to timely object to hearsay testimony from the State's firearms expert concerning the type of firearm for which the holster was designed.
2. Whether the ineffective assistance resulting from counsel's failure to object to the firearms testimony was prejudicial under Strickland.
3. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the holster seized from Cobb's apartment.
4. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to seek redaction of Cobb's misdemeanor concealed-weapons plea from evidence of his first-offender sentence.
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Cobb guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Disposition

reversed