Summary
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the best-interest standard in OCGA § 29-2-8(b) must be narrowly construed to protect a biological parent's constitutional right to raise a child. Before continuing a temporary guardianship over the parent's objection, the third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that returning custody to the parent would cause physical or significant, long-term emotional harm, and must then show that continuation of the guardianship would best promote the child's welfare. The court reversed and remanded because the juvenile court applied a preponderance standard and made no required finding of harm.
Holdings
- The best-interest standard in OCGA § 29-2-8(b) is constitutional only when narrowly construed in accordance with the safeguards applicable to custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party.
- Before a temporary guardianship may be continued over a biological parent's request for termination, the third-party guardian must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer physical or significant, long-term emotional harm if custody is returned to the biological parent; after that showing, the guardian must prove that continuation of the guardianship will best promote the child's welfare and happiness.
- The juvenile court erred by denying termination of the temporary guardianship without finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination would harm the child.
Questions Presented
- Whether OCGA § 29-2-8(b)'s best-interest standard for deciding whether to terminate a temporary guardianship must be narrowly construed to protect a biological parent's constitutional right to raise her child.
- What evidentiary showing a third-party temporary guardian must make before a temporary guardianship may be continued over a biological parent's request for termination.
- Whether the juvenile court erred by continuing the temporary guardianship without finding by clear and convincing evidence that returning custody to the biological parent would harm the child.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (9)
- In the Interest of J.R.R., 281 Ga. 662, 663, 641 S.E.2d 526 (2007)(cited)
- Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 544 S.E.2d 99 (2001)(followed)
- In the Matter of Guardianship of Doe, 93 Hawai'i 374, 4 P.3d 508 (2000)(cited)
- In the Matter of Bunting, 311 A.2d 855 (Del. 1973)(cited)
- In re Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 682 N.W.2d 238 (2004)(cited)
- In the Matter of the Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 869 P.2d 661 (1994)(cited)
- Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 976 A.2d 955 (Me. 2009)(cited)
- In the Interest of SRB-M, 201 P.3d 1115 (Wyo. 2009)(cited)
- Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978)(cited)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.