State of Idaho v. David Allen Dalrymple

Summary

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed David Allen Dalrymple’s convictions and sentences for lewd conduct with a child, sexual abuse of a child, and second-degree kidnapping. The court held that Dalrymple knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and that the district court did not violate his compulsory-process right or make prejudicial comments. The court also upheld the sentences as within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion.

Holdings

1. Faretta warnings need not be given contemporaneously with a defendant's waiver of counsel; the validity of the waiver is determined from the totality of the circumstances, so long as the record establishes that the defendant understood the risks and consequences of self-representation.
2. The district court did not impermissibly coerce Dalrymple by permitting him either to proceed to closing argument without presenting the proposed defense or to discharge counsel and reopen the case to present it pro se.
3. Refusing to allow Dalrymple to recall K.B. did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process because he failed to make a plausible showing that her proposed testimony would be material and favorable to his defense.
4. The district court did not make prejudicial comments by requiring Dalrymple to establish qualifications before offering expert hypnosis testimony and by limiting him to relevant lay testimony.
5. The sentences were not excessive and did not constitute an abuse of discretion because they were within the statutory limits and were reasonable in light of the offenses, Dalrymple's character, public protection, and applicable sentencing goals.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Dalrymple knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he discharged counsel after the evidentiary phase of trial.
2. Whether the district court impermissibly coerced Dalrymple by conditioning presentation of his hypnosis defense on discharging counsel and proceeding pro se.
3. Whether refusal to allow Dalrymple to recall K.B. violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.
4. Whether the district court made prejudicial comments on Dalrymple's testimony in the presence of the jury.
5. Whether Dalrymple's sentences were excessive or constituted an abuse of discretion.

Disposition

affirmed