Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill. 2d 483

Summary

The Illinois Supreme Court held that an employee's malicious defamation claims against United Parcel Service and its employees were not preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court also held that the claims were not preempted by the National Labor Relations Board's primary jurisdiction because defamation implicates a deeply rooted state interest and the complaint alleged actual malice. The appellate court's reversal of the trial court's dismissal was affirmed.

Holdings

1. A state-law malicious-defamation claim arising from an employer's investigation and discharge of a unionized employee is not preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act when the claim creates rights independent of the collective-bargaining agreement and its resolution does not require interpreting that agreement.
2. The malicious-defamation claims were not preempted by the NLRB's exclusive or primary jurisdiction merely because the alleged motive could arguably be characterized as an unfair labor practice.
3. Where statements made in an employer-employee relationship are protected by a qualified privilege, the plaintiff must plead and prove actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether the statements were true or false.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Krasinski's state-law malicious-defamation claims were preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because their resolution allegedly required interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.
2. Whether the claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Board's primary jurisdiction under the Garmon doctrine because the alleged motive could be characterized as an unfair labor practice.

Disposition

affirmed