Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 127 Ill. 2d 350

Summary

The Supreme Court of Illinois considered negligence and wrongful-death claims arising from a motorcyclist's collision with a stopped railroad car at a crossing. The court held that comparative negligence did not alter the railroad's duty under the traditional stopped-train rule, and that the complaint failed to allege special circumstances requiring additional warnings. The court also held that alleged violations of Illinois Commerce Commission crossing-safety rules did not state a cause of action because the rules were not intended to protect against the type of injury alleged.

Holdings

1. A stopped train at a crossing generally constitutes adequate notice and warning of its presence to a traveler exercising ordinary care; additional warnings are required only when special or extraordinary circumstances are alleged. The complaint did not allege circumstances sufficient to invoke that exception and therefore failed to state a common-law negligence claim concerning the initial collision.
2. The adoption of comparative-negligence principles did not expand or otherwise alter the duty owed by a railroad to motorists approaching a standing train at a crossing.
3. The alleged failure to place a flagman or flares at the rear of a stopped train did not state a negligence claim because the alleged omission had no relationship to the decedent's collision with the side of the train and could not, as a matter of law, be the proximate cause of that collision.
4. Counts alleging negligent violation of Illinois Commerce Commission crossing-safety rules failed to state a cause of action because the rules were not intended to protect motorists from collisions with stopped trains and the alleged violations could not proximately cause the collision described in the complaint.
5. Plaintiffs waived any error in the dismissal of the wilful-and-wanton counts and of the allegations that the train crew negligently failed to discover that a collision had occurred before restarting the train because plaintiffs presented no appellate argument addressing those claims.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the complaint stated a common-law negligence claim based on the railroad's failure to provide additional warnings of a stopped train at a crossing.
2. Whether darkness, lack of lighting, traffic, the grade and condition of the crossing, and alleged distractions constituted special circumstances creating an exception to the rule that a stopped train is adequate warning of its presence.
3. Whether the adoption of comparative negligence altered or expanded the railroad's duty to warn motorists approaching a standing train.
4. Whether the railroad's failure to place a flagman or flares at the rear of the train could be a legal duty or proximate cause of a motorist's collision with the side of the train.
5. Whether alleged violations of Illinois Commerce Commission crossing-safety rules stated a cause of action where the rules were not intended to prevent collisions between motorists and stopped trains.
6. Whether plaintiffs waived appellate challenges to the dismissal of the wilful-and-wanton counts and allegations concerning the railroad's failure to discover that a collision had occurred.

Disposition

affirmed