People v. Lacy

Summary

The Illinois Supreme Court held that section 103-5(c) of the Illinois speedy-trial statute permits one continuance of up to 60 days for each specific item of material evidence, rather than a single 60-day total limit. The court reversed the circuit and appellate court judgments dismissing the charges and remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. Section 103-5(c) permits one continuance of not more than 60 days for each distinct item of material evidence the State seeks to obtain, provided the statutory conditions are satisfied; it does not impose a single aggregate 60-day limit for all material evidence.
2. The State was entitled to seek one continuance of not more than 60 days to obtain Pope's testimony and a separate continuance of not more than 60 days to obtain Reamy's testimony because the witnesses supplied different material evidence.
3. The interpretation allowing separate 60-day continuances for distinct material evidence is sufficiently definite to implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Questions Presented

1. Whether section 103-5(c) of the Illinois speedy-trial statute permits the State to obtain separate continuances of not more than 60 days each when different items of material evidence become unavailable at different times.
2. Whether section 103-5(c) limits the State to a total of 60 days of continuance regardless of the number of unavailable witnesses or items of material evidence.
3. Whether the continuances granted to obtain the testimony of Rebecca Pope and Officer Reamy violated the statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded