Wilson v. Isaacs

Summary

The Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana Tort Claims Act law-enforcement immunity does not shield governmental entities or employees from liability for a law-enforcement officer's use of unreasonable or excessive force. Because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether a deputy's repeated use of a taser was reasonable and necessary to effect an arrest, the court reversed summary judgment for the Sheriff. The court summarily affirmed summary judgment for the deputy personally.

Holdings

1. A law-enforcement officer's use of force in excess of the reasonable force authorized by statute is not shielded from liability by the Indiana Tort Claims Act's enforcement-of-a-law immunity under Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(8).
2. Genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Deputy Craven's conduct was reasonable and whether he reasonably believed the force was necessary to effect a lawful arrest precluded summary judgment on the plaintiffs' liability claims against the Sheriff.
3. The Court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision affirming summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims against Deputy Craven personally because the plaintiffs did not seek relief on transfer as to that portion of the decision.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Indiana Tort Claims Act law-enforcement immunity under Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(8) shields governmental defendants from liability for a law-enforcement officer's allegedly unreasonable or excessive use of force.
2. Whether genuine issues of material fact concerning the reasonableness and necessity of Deputy Craven's use of force preclude summary judgment.
3. Whether summary judgment for Deputy Craven personally should stand where the plaintiffs did not seek relief on transfer from the Court of Appeals' affirmance.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded