State of Hawaiʻi v. Hailey Dandurand

Summary

The Hawaiʻi Intermediate Court of Appeals issued a nonprecedential Summary Disposition Order affirming Hailey Dandurand’s convictions and sentences arising from a jury trial. The court rejected or declined to decide her claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, witness competency, consecutive sentencing, admission of a statement made during a field show-up, discovery sanctions, and denial of a continuance.

Holdings

1. A defendant asserting ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to obtain witnesses must support the claim with affidavits or sworn statements describing the proposed testimony. Because Dandurand provided no such statements, she failed on the potential-impairment prong, although the claims were preserved without prejudice for a later HRPP Rule 40 petition.
2. Dandurand did not establish ineffective assistance from counsel's alleged failure to obtain Brown's trial transcripts or cross-examine two witnesses because the record did not show that counsel lacked access to the relevant information or that the challenged decisions were not strategic.
3. Although counsel's failure to timely file Dandurand's motion for new trial was an error reflecting a lack of skill, judgment, or diligence, it did not constitute ineffective assistance because none of the motion's asserted grounds supported a potentially meritorious defense or a new trial.
4. Dandurand failed to establish ineffective assistance because counsel actually raised the Miranda, voluntariness, Rule 403, and hearsay arguments she claimed should have been made, and counsel's evidentiary choices were strategic.
5. The prosecutor's argument that a Facebook video contradicted Dandurand's claim of abuse was not improper prosecutorial misconduct because it was a reasonable inference from admitted evidence, not unsupported expert testimony or a personal assertion about psychological trauma.
6. The circuit court did not err in finding M.E. competent to testify because she could communicate, understood the difference between truth and lies, agreed to take an oath, promised to tell the truth, and understood that lying could result in trouble.
7. A defendant is not entitled to have a jury find the facts supporting consecutive sentences under HRS § 706-668.5 when no individual sentence exceeds the applicable statutory maximum; judicial fact-finding for consecutive sentencing remains permissible.
8. The field-show-up statement was admissible because, although Dandurand was in custody, the officer's instruction to stand, look straight ahead, and not move was not interrogation; the statement was unsolicited, spontaneous, and voluntary.
9. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding defense experts as a discovery sanction because the defense failed to disclose expert identities and reports despite repeated requests and court orders, acted in apparent bad faith, and substantially prejudiced the prosecution after jury selection began.
10. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance sought to obtain a sentencing mitigation specialist because Dandurand did not exercise due diligence and did not provide sworn evidence showing that the proposed witness would offer relevant and material testimony beneficial to her.

Questions Presented

1. Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain defense witnesses or sentencing experts, obtain or use transcripts from Brown's trial, timely file a motion for new trial, or present legally cognizable grounds to exclude Dandurand's field-show-up statement.
2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that Dandurand's conduct was inconsistent with the behavior of an abuse victim.
3. Whether the circuit court correctly found a minor witness competent to testify.
4. Whether Dandurand was entitled to have a jury determine facts supporting consecutive sentences.
5. Whether Dandurand's unsolicited field-show-up statement was the product of an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation.
6. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding defense expert witnesses as a sanction for HRPP Rule 16 discovery violations.
7. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying a continuance of the extended-term sentencing hearing.

Disposition

affirmed