Summary
The Iowa Supreme Court addresses defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims arising from a Davenport alderman's public repetition of false allegations about a teen dance club. The court holds that the alderman's statements were made on a qualifiedly privileged occasion, but that whether he abused the privilege by acting with knowing or reckless disregard for the truth presented a genuine issue of material fact. The court reverses summary judgment on the defamation claim and affirms dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for failure to show severe or extreme emotional distress.
Holdings
- An alderman is entitled to a qualified privilege for statements made in the performance of official duties on a subject pertinent and relevant to the occasion. Nickolas's statements at the Davenport City Council meeting concerning alleged indecent and illegal conduct at The Factory were made on a qualifiedly privileged occasion.
- To defeat a qualified privilege, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant published the defamatory statement with knowing or reckless disregard for its truth. The former common-law wrongful-motive or ill-will standard is abandoned.
- Summary judgment for defendants on the defamation claim was improper because the record contained sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Nickolas acted with knowing or reckless disregard for the truth and thereby abused the qualified privilege.
- Summary judgment for defendants on the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was proper because The Factory, as a limited liability company, could not suffer emotional distress and Barreca's alleged humiliation, embarrassment, stress, and sleeplessness did not constitute severe or extreme emotional distress.
Questions Presented
- Whether Nickolas's statements at the city-council meeting were made on a qualifiedly privileged occasion.
- Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that Nickolas abused the qualified privilege through actual malice.
- Whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of severe or extreme emotional distress to sustain an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (21)
- Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District, 360 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1984)(followed in part)
- Delaney v. International Union UAW Local No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 2004)(followed)
- Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 2000)(followed)
- Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1989)(followed in part)
- Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217 (Iowa 1998)(not at issue)
- Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1996)(followed)
- Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1994)(followed)
- Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954)(followed)
- Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1968)(limited)
- Winckel v. Von Maur, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 2002)(disapproved in part)
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