State v. John Feregrino, Jr.

Summary

The Iowa Supreme Court held that Carter Lake Municipal Ordinance 55.12(cc), which prohibits motor-vehicle noise audible from 100 feet or more, was not unconstitutionally vague and that evidence obtained during the traffic stop was properly admitted. The court overruled State v. Stallings to the extent it presumed prejudice from a deficient jury-trial waiver under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1), requiring an ineffective-assistance claimant to establish actual prejudice. Because the appellate record was inadequate to determine prejudice, the court preserved the claim for post-conviction relief, vacated the court of appeals decision, and affirmed the district court judgment.

Holdings

1. The provision of Carter Lake Municipal Ordinance 55.12(cc) prohibiting noise emanating from a motor vehicle that can be heard from 100 feet or more is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Feregrino.
2. Because the noise-ordinance provision was not unconstitutionally vague, evidence obtained pursuant to the stop was properly admitted.
3. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to ensure compliance with the jury-trial-waiver requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) must prove both breach of an essential duty and actual prejudice; prejudice is not presumed.
4. The appellate record was inadequate to determine whether Feregrino was actually prejudiced, so the ineffective-assistance claim was preserved for postconviction relief.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Carter Lake municipal noise ordinance provision prohibiting motor-vehicle noise audible from 100 feet was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
2. Whether evidence obtained during the traffic stop was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree because the stop was based on an allegedly vague noise ordinance.
3. Whether counsel's failure to ensure full compliance with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) regarding a jury-trial waiver requires presumed prejudice or instead requires the defendant to prove actual prejudice.
4. Whether the existing appellate record was sufficient to determine whether Feregrino was actually prejudiced by the deficient jury-trial waiver procedure.

Disposition

vacated