Hampton v. Commonwealth

Summary

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Karen Hampton’s convictions for murdering her husband and tampering with physical evidence. The court addressed the admissibility of lay opinion and double-hearsay evidence, evidence concerning the death of the family cat, victim-related character evidence, and the application of Kentucky’s violent-offender parole statute. The court held that Hampton was eligible for parole consideration after serving twenty years of her fifty-five-year sentence.

Holdings

1. A nonexpert witness may testify that two signatures did not look the same when the opinion is rationally based on the witness's personal perception and is helpful to determining a fact in issue. The bank manager's testimony was admissible under KRE 701.
2. The prior directed verdict on the animal-cruelty charge did not bar admission of evidence concerning the cat's death in a later trial for murder and tampering when the evidence was offered under KRE 404(b) and was subject to a lower burden of proof than the prior criminal charge. Commonwealth v. Hillebrand is overruled to the extent inconsistent with this holding.
3. The challenged testimony was admissible because each level of the double hearsay fell within a recognized hearsay exception.
4. The testimony about the victim's good character was relevant to rebut Hampton's defense theory and, in the absence of an objection, did not constitute palpable error.
5. Although the law-of-the-case doctrine ordinarily barred reconsideration of the parole issue decided in Hampton's first appeal, the court could correct that prior decision because it was clearly and palpably erroneous and the second appeal was still pending when Hughes was decided. Hampton was therefore eligible for parole consideration after serving twenty years of her fifty-five-year sentence.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a bank manager who had processed a loan could give lay opinion testimony that the victim's signature on loan documents did not look like his driver's-license signature under KRE 701.
2. Whether evidence concerning the death of the family cat was barred by collateral estoppel or double jeopardy principles after the animal-cruelty charge had been dismissed by directed verdict in the first trial.
3. Whether testimony recounting statements by Hampton and by the victim constituted inadmissible double hearsay.
4. Whether evidence concerning the victim's good character constituted impermissible victim-impact evidence during the guilt phase.
5. Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine barred application of Hughes v. Commonwealth to determine Hampton's parole eligibility.

Disposition

affirmed