Lickliter v. Commonwealth

Summary

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Philip Alan Lickliter’s convictions for murder and tampering with physical evidence. The court held that the trial court properly denied instructions on voluntary intoxication, second-degree manslaughter, insanity, and self-protection, properly admitted his confession and testimony concerning the victim’s decomposition, and committed no reversible instructional error.

Holdings

1. A defendant is not entitled to a voluntary-intoxication instruction absent evidence that intoxication negated an offense element; because Lickliter's confession showed an intentional killing, he was not entitled to that instruction or the related second-degree manslaughter instruction.
2. Lickliter was not entitled to an insanity instruction because the defense evidence showed drug abuse and symptoms of delusion but did not establish a mental illness or mental retardation as required by the statutory definition of insanity.
3. The confession was admissible because questioning stopped after Lickliter requested counsel, he later initiated renewed communication, received a complete Miranda warning, and knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.
4. Testimony concerning the odor and advanced decomposition of the victim's body was relevant and admissible; its gruesome or inflammatory character did not require exclusion.
5. The trial court's failure to separately refer to extreme emotional disturbance in the presumption-of-innocence instruction was not palpable error, and the first-degree manslaughter instruction did not improperly require proof of extreme emotional disturbance as an element.
6. The evidence did not support any self-protection or related lesser-offense instruction because Lickliter did not believe that unlawful physical force against him was imminent.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the evidence supported jury instructions on voluntary intoxication, second-degree manslaughter, or insanity.
2. Whether Lickliter's confession should have been suppressed because police continued questioning after he requested counsel.
3. Whether testimony concerning the victim's decomposed body was inadmissible or unfairly prejudicial.
4. Whether the jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt, extreme emotional disturbance, and first-degree manslaughter constituted reversible or palpable error.
5. Whether the evidence supported instructions on self-protection, imperfect self-protection, second-degree manslaughter, or reckless homicide.

Disposition

affirmed