J.A.S. v. Bushelman

Summary

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky courts have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a paternity action concerning a child born to a married woman, even when she maintained a sexual relationship with her husband during the relevant period. The Court construed KRS 406.011 as codifying a rebuttable presumption of paternity rather than restricting jurisdiction, held that the putative biological father had standing under KRS 406.021, and overruled J.N.R. v. O'Reilly to the extent it was viewed as binding precedent.

Holdings

1. KRS 406.011 does not define the jurisdictional limits of paternity actions or bar courts from adjudicating the paternity of a child born to a married woman. KRS 406.051 governs subject matter jurisdiction for an action brought under KRS Chapter 406.
2. The husband of a mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the marriage or within ten months after termination of the marriage or marital relationship, but the presumption is rebuttable and does not make the husband's paternity conclusive.
3. DNA evidence may be used as an evidentiary means to rebut the traditional presumption of paternity when it establishes biological paternity with the required degree of certainty.
4. A birth out of wedlock under KRS 406.180 occurs when a child is born to a woman who, regardless of her marital status, was not lawfully married to the biological father at the time of conception or birth.
5. C.H.E. had standing under KRS 406.021 to initiate the paternity action as a putative father.
6. A writ of prohibition was unavailable because the trial court was acting within its subject matter jurisdiction and had properly denied J.A.S.'s motion to dismiss.

Questions Presented

1. Whether KRS 406.011 limits subject matter jurisdiction over paternity actions to cases involving a child whose mother's marital relationship ceased more than ten months before birth.
2. Whether a child born to a married woman may be considered a child born out of wedlock when the alleged biological father is not her husband.
3. Whether a putative father may initiate a paternity action concerning a child born to a married woman whose marriage remained intact.
4. Whether the trial court was proceeding outside its subject matter jurisdiction so as to justify a writ of prohibition.

Disposition

affirmed