Darryl Parker v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Summary

The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Darryl Parker’s convictions and twenty-five-year sentence for two robberies, tampering with physical evidence, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Parker’s belated motion for a continuance to investigate DNA evidence. The court also addressed Parker’s claims concerning cross-examination and penalty-phase evidence and denied the requested relief.

Holdings

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Parker's belated motion for a continuance because the motion resulted largely from Parker's lack of diligence, was not based on late disclosure by the Commonwealth, and was unsupported by specifically articulable exculpatory potential or identifiable prejudice.
2. Even assuming that asking Parker whether the accomplice was mistaken violated the rule announced in Moss v. Commonwealth, the unpreserved questioning did not constitute palpable error because it merely verbalized Parker's own defense theory and did not prejudice him or render the trial manifestly unjust.
3. Parker was not entitled to palpable-error relief or a new penalty phase even assuming that unredacted certified conviction records containing impermissible prior-offense details were provided to the jury, because he failed to show a reasonable possibility that the information affected the twenty-five-year sentence.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or violated due process by denying Parker's eve-of-trial motion for a continuance to allow further expert review of the Commonwealth's DNA evidence.
2. Whether the prosecutor's question asking Parker whether an accomplice was mistaken in identifying him as a participant constituted a Moss violation and palpable error requiring reversal.
3. Whether the admission or possible jury exposure to unredacted certified records containing details of prior offenses constituted palpable error requiring a new penalty phase.

Disposition

affirmed