Moores v. Doyle, 2003 ME 105

Summary

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a judgment determining that Larry Doyle was the biological father of Larry C. Moores. The court held that Doyle waived any challenge to service of the original paternity action, and that a technical defect in service of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was harmless. Although the trial court improperly granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the error was harmless because the Department of Human Services could intervene or initiate a new paternity action.

Holdings

1. A defense of insufficient service of process must be raised in a responsive pleading or by motion; because Doyle did not raise the defense and participated in the action, he waived it and could not collaterally attack service in the postjudgment proceeding.
2. A Rule 60(b) motion in an action otherwise governed by Rule 80 is not a motion seeking modification or enforcement of the judgment under Rule 80(k); therefore, personal service under Rule 80(k) was not required.
3. Even though the motion was mailed to Doyle rather than his attorney of record as Rule 5(b) generally requires, the defect was harmless because Doyle received timely actual notice and showed no prejudice.
4. The District Court abused its discretion by granting Moores's Rule 60(b)(6) motion because she relied on alleged legal errors, failed to appeal the 1995 judgment, identified no equitable grounds, and did not explain the nearly four-year delay.
5. The error in granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief was harmless and did not require reversal because DHS participated in the proceeding and could have independently filed a new paternity complaint; allowing paternity to be determined in the existing proceeding did not affect any substantial right of Doyle.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Doyle waived his challenge to service of process in the 1995 paternity action by failing to raise insufficient service in a responsive pleading or motion and by participating in the proceedings.
2. Whether service of Moores's 1999 Rule 60(b)(6) motion was governed by M.R. Civ. P. 80(k) personal-service requirements or by M.R. Civ. P. 5, and whether the method of service caused reversible prejudice.
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by granting Moores relief from the 1995 summary judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), and whether that error required disturbing the final paternity judgment.

Disposition

affirmed