Maietta Construction, Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53

Summary

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed dismissal of Maietta Construction's claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light, interference with an advantageous relationship, and punitive damages under Maine's anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the defendants' communications to municipal officials and the press constituted petitioning activity supported by an arguable factual and legal basis, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of actual damages. The court also affirmed the trial court's discretionary award of attorney fees to one defendant but not the other.

Holdings

1. Communications to the South Portland City Council, mayor, and local media concerning alleged violations of deed and contract restrictions constituted petitioning activity within the scope of 14 M.R.S.A. § 556.
2. The trial court properly concluded that Wainwright's petitioning activity had an arguable legitimate factual basis because affidavits stated that he personally observed soil removal and photographs purported to document removal of loam.
3. Damages presumed for defamation per se are not equivalent to actual damages under section 556; a plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence from which the amount of actual injury can be determined with reasonable certainty.
4. The attorney-fee provision of section 556 is permissive, not presumptive; a trial court may award fees in its discretion and does not abuse its discretion by awarding fees to one Anti-SLAPP movant while denying them to another based on the relative merit of the claims.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Maine's Anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 556, applied to Maietta's claims based on Wainwright's communications to city officials and the press.
2. Whether Wainwright's petitioning activity had a reasonable factual basis or arguable basis in law.
3. Whether section 556 requires the responding plaintiff to show actual injury, rather than presumed damages or damages per se.
4. Whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to Lourie but declining to award attorney fees to Wainwright.

Disposition

affirmed