Damon v. S.D. Warren Co., 2010 ME 24

Summary

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the workers’ compensation retiree presumption did not apply because Damon immediately transitioned from employment with S.D. Warren to full-time work at his post-injury earning capacity. The court also held that employer-paid retiree health and life insurance premiums were not subject to offset under the coordination-of-benefits statute because those benefits had not been included in calculating his average weekly wage, and it remanded for further proceedings on that issue.

Holdings

1. An employee does not necessarily terminate active employment for purposes of 39-A M.R.S. § 223 merely by retiring from the employer from whom workers' compensation benefits are sought. Because Damon immediately moved into full-time employment at his full post-injury earning capacity and continued working steadily without a break, the retiree presumption did not apply.
2. Employer-paid retiree health and life insurance premiums were not subject to an offset under 39 M.R.S.A. § 62-B because the premiums were not wage-replacement benefits and their value had not been included in Damon's pre-injury average weekly wage. Allowing the offset would not prevent a double recovery or stacking of benefits.
3. The court rejected S.D. Warren's additional arguments concerning the permanent-impairment petition, the compensability of a litigation-related permanent-impairment evaluation, and the statute of repose, but did not discuss them further.

Questions Presented

1. Whether an employee who retires from one employer and immediately begins full-time employment with another employer has terminated active employment for purposes of the retiree presumption under 39-A M.R.S. § 223.
2. Whether employer-paid retiree health and life insurance premiums may be offset against workers' compensation incapacity benefits under 39 M.R.S.A. § 62-B when the value of those fringe benefits was not included in the calculation of the employee's pre-injury average weekly wage.
3. Whether the hearing officer erred in considering Damon's permanent-impairment petition, treating a litigation-related permanent-impairment evaluation as a compensable medical expense, or concluding that the medical-expense claim was not barred by the statute of repose.

Disposition

other