State v. DiGennaro, 415 Md. 551

Summary

The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the term "operating" in the manslaughter-by-vehicle statute is synonymous with the Transportation Article definitions of driving and operating. Because the defendant's grossly negligent conduct occurred after he stopped operating the vehicle—when he failed to remove or warn of gravel spilled onto a highway—his conviction for manslaughter by vehicle could not stand. The court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals, noting that the conduct might support common-law involuntary manslaughter, but that offense was not charged.

Holdings

1. The term "operate" in Criminal Law § 2-209 is synonymous with the Transportation Article definitions of "drive" and "control" and therefore does not encompass post-operation remedial omissions.
2. DiGennaro could not be convicted of manslaughter by vehicle because the victim's death resulted from his failure to take post-operation remedial action, not from grossly negligent conduct while he was operating the vehicle.
3. A person may be convicted of common-law involuntary manslaughter when an unintentional death results from grossly negligent failure to perform a legal duty, provided the State proves the duty, causation, awareness of the duty, and awareness that failure to perform it created a high degree of risk to human life.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the term "operating" in Criminal Law § 2-209 is different from the terms "driving" and "controlling" in that statute.
2. Whether a driver's post-operation failure to remove debris, mark a hazard, or notify others of a roadway danger constitutes operating a motor vehicle for purposes of manslaughter by vehicle.
3. Whether DiGennaro could be convicted of manslaughter by vehicle when the death resulted from post-operation omissions rather than grossly negligent conduct occurring while he was actually operating the vehicle.

Disposition

affirmed