Dana Mark Gamarra v. Oakland County, Oakland County Sheriff's Department, and Deputy Keith Lybyron Dean

Summary

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that factual disputes precluded summary disposition for Oakland County and the Oakland County Sheriff’s Department on plaintiff’s claim under the governmental motor-vehicle exception. The court affirmed summary disposition for Deputy Keith Lybyron Dean, concluding that the evidence did not establish gross negligence under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

1. Summary disposition was improper as to Oakland County and the Oakland County Sheriff's Department because disputed evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find that Deputy Dean breached his duty to operate the emergency vehicle with reasonable care and that his conduct was a proximate cause of the collision.
2. Plaintiff's failure to yield did not establish that he was more than 50 percent at fault as a matter of law or eliminate the possibility that Deputy Dean's conduct was also a proximate cause. The comparative-fault issues had to be resolved by a jury.
3. Deputy Dean was entitled to governmental immunity because the evidence, even viewed in plaintiff's favor, did not support a finding that his conduct was gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the injury.
4. The Court declined to review defendants' alternative argument concerning the serious-impairment threshold because defendants abandoned the issue by failing to include it in their counterstatement of questions presented and conceding at oral argument that they were not seeking review.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Oakland County and the Oakland County Sheriff's Department were entitled to summary disposition under the governmental motor-vehicle exception because no reasonable jury could find negligent operation or proximate causation.
2. Whether plaintiff's failure to yield to an authorized emergency vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the accident or whether comparative negligence and the conduct of Deputy Dean presented jury questions.
3. Whether Deputy Dean's conduct constituted gross negligence that was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries under the Governmental Tort Liability Act.
4. Whether defendants' alternative challenge to plaintiff's no-fault threshold injury was properly before the Court of Appeals.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded