People of the State of Michigan v. Robert Lance Propp

Summary

The Michigan Supreme Court held that accident is not an affirmative defense to first-degree premeditated murder because the prosecution bears the burden of proving intent to kill. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the denial of expert funding and remanded for application of the due-process standard governing requests for expert assistance. The Court also held that rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, may be considered when determining the admissibility of domestic-violence other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27b.

Holdings

1. Accident is not an affirmative defense to first-degree premeditated murder because the prosecution bears the burden of proving intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, and a defendant asserting accident does not bear the burden of negating that element.
2. Under People v. Kennedy and the due-process analysis of Ake v. Oklahoma, an indigent criminal defendant seeking appointment of an expert at government expense must show a reasonable probability both that the expert would assist the defense and that denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial. The Court of Appeals erred by applying the additional substantial-basis standard for affirmative defenses to defendant's accident theory.
3. Rules of evidence not specifically mentioned in MCL 768.27b may be considered when determining whether domestic-violence other-acts evidence is admissible under that statute. Accordingly, MRE 802's hearsay prohibition applies, and the trial court erred by failing to consider it.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the defense of accident to first-degree premeditated murder is an affirmative defense requiring a defendant seeking government-funded expert assistance to show a substantial basis for the defense.
2. Whether an indigent criminal defendant's request for government-funded expert assistance is governed by the due-process standard requiring a reasonable probability that the expert would assist the defense and that denial would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.
3. Whether MCL 768.27b permits consideration of rules of evidence other than MRE 403, including MRE 802's hearsay rule, when determining the admissibility of domestic-violence other-acts evidence.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded