Julius Wesley Kiker v. State of Mississippi

Summary

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest because he simultaneously represented the defendant and a prosecution witness. Because the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive the conflict, prejudice was presumed under the Sixth Amendment. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and the denial of post-conviction relief, and remanded the case.

Holdings

1. Defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest because Barnett simultaneously represented Kiker and Crawford, a prosecution witness against Kiker, creating irreconcilable duties of loyalty.
2. Cocounsel's role did not cure Barnett's conflict; the conflict was imputed to cocounsel because both attorneys jointly represented Kiker.
3. Because Barnett actively represented conflicting interests, Kiker was not required to demonstrate specific prejudice; prejudice was presumed and reversal was automatic absent a knowing and intelligent waiver.
4. Kiker did not knowingly and intelligently waive the actual conflict of interest.

Questions Presented

1. Whether defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest by simultaneously representing Kiker and Crawford, a prosecution witness against Kiker.
2. Whether the representation by cocounsel, Darryl Hurt, cured or avoided the conflict attributable to Barnett.
3. Whether Kiker was required to demonstrate specific prejudice under Strickland despite counsel's actual conflict.
4. Whether Kiker knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded