Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Missouri Real Estate Commission

344 S.W.3d 160 (Mo. banc 2011) · Supreme Court of Missouri · July 19, 2011 · No. SC 91125

Summary

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed an injunction prohibiting Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc. from performing activities requiring a real estate license under chapter 339. The court held that the company’s referral, marketing, and rental-advisor activities were not covered by the statutory exemption for persons retained to manage real property. It rejected the company’s constitutional challenges based on free speech, equal protection, special-law, and vagueness provisions.

Holdings

  1. KCPA's compensated referral, marketing, recommendation, and advisory activities fell within the statutory definition of real-estate brokerage activities requiring a license.
  2. KCPA did not qualify for the exemption because its activities were not limited to the enumerated property-management activities.
  3. The challenged provisions did not violate the First Amendment or article I, section 8, of the Missouri Constitution.
  4. Section 339.010.7 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause or article I, section 2, of the Missouri Constitution.
  5. Section 339.010.7 was not a special law prohibited by article III, section 40(30), of the Missouri Constitution.
  6. The challenged provisions were not unconstitutionally vague.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether KCPA's activities constituted real-estate brokerage activities requiring licensure under section 339.010.1.
  2. Whether KCPA qualified for the property-management exemption in section 339.010.7(5).
  3. Whether the challenged provisions violated the First Amendment or article I, section 8, of the Missouri Constitution by regulating protected commercial speech.
  4. Whether section 339.010.7 violated federal or state equal-protection guarantees.
  5. Whether section 339.010.7 was an unconstitutional special law under article III, section 40(30), of the Missouri Constitution.
  6. Whether the challenged provisions were unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process.

Disposition

affirmed

Cases Cited (25)

  • Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976)(followed)
  • In re Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2007)(followed)
  • Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Mo. banc 2011)(followed)
  • Brinker Missouri, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 319 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Mo. banc 2010)(followed)
  • Miller Nationwide Real Estate Corp. v. Sikeston Motel Corp., 418 S.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Mo. 1967)(followed)
  • In re Brasch, 332 S.W.3d 115, 119 (Mo. banc 2011)(followed)
  • Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)(followed)
  • National Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000)(followed)
  • Underhill Associates, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 674 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1982)(followed)
  • Accountant's Society of Virginia v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1988)(followed)

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