Town of Columbus v. Harrington

Summary

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed Loren Robert Harrington’s misdemeanor DUI conviction. The court held that the prosecutor’s comments and testimony regarding Harrington’s post-Miranda silence did not constitute Doyle error, although a separate comment regarding the absence of contradictory evidence was improper but harmless. The court also upheld admission of preliminary alcohol screening test results, the use of a report to refresh an officer’s recollection, and the challenged jury instructions.

Holdings

1. The prosecutor's voir-dire comments that Harrington did not have to testify, and testimony that Harrington received and heeded Miranda warnings, did not constitute Doyle error because they did not suggest that Harrington refused to give a statement or testify. The prosecutor's isolated closing comment that the State's evidence was uncontradicted was an improper reference to Harrington's decision not to testify, but the error was harmless.
2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Newell to refer to his report and notes to refresh his memory under Rule 612, Montana Rules of Evidence.
3. The portion of Rule 23.4.201(7)(b), ARM, limiting preliminary breath-test analysis to probable-cause evidence was invalid insofar as it conflicted with amended § 61-8-404(1)(b), MCA; the District Court correctly refused to exclude the PAST results on that basis.
4. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the PAST results after considering testimony and a training manual outside the jury's presence to establish that the device was approved and properly field-tested.
5. The jury instructions, considered as a whole, fully and fairly informed the jury of the applicable law.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the prosecutor's comments and testimony concerning Harrington's decision to remain silent violated the Fifth Amendment, Montana's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, or due process, and whether the unpreserved claims were reviewable under the common-law plain-error doctrine.
2. Whether the District Court erred by permitting Officer Newell to use an arrest report and notes to refresh his memory and by admitting the preliminary alcohol screening test results.
3. Whether the jury instructions concerning expert opinions and the statutory inferences from alcohol-concentration evidence fully and fairly presented the law.

Disposition

affirmed