Lewison v. Renner

Summary

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Barbara Lewison’s motion for a new trial after a jury returned a general defense verdict in her automobile negligence action against Carol Renner. The court held that Renner’s admission that the collision caused “some injury” did not concede that the collision caused all of Lewison’s claimed injuries or damages. Because Lewison’s expert testimony on causation was equivocal and she presented no evidence establishing the amount of medical expenses, the verdict was supported by the evidence.

Holdings

1. Renner's unconditional admissions that she was negligent and that her negligence proximately caused the collision established the first two negligence elements as a matter of law and relieved Lewison of the burden to prove them.
2. When a defendant admits that a collision caused some injury but expressly denies the nature and extent of the plaintiff's claimed injuries and damages, the admission does not concede that the collision caused all of the injuries claimed.
3. When an alleged injury is subjective rather than objective, the plaintiff must establish the cause and extent of the injury through expert medical testimony sufficient to show causation as probable, or more likely than not; testimony based only on possibility or speculation is insufficient.
4. The general verdict for Renner was supported by the evidence because the jury could find that Lewison failed to prove either that the collision proximately caused her claimed injuries or the nature and extent of her damages.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Lewison's motion for new trial after the jury returned a general verdict for Renner.
2. Whether Renner's admission that the collision caused "some injury" relieved Lewison of proving that her specific claimed injuries and damages were proximately caused by the collision.
3. Whether the evidence supported the jury's finding that Lewison failed to prove the causation and nature and extent of her damages.

Disposition

affirmed