State of Nebraska v. John W. Dalton, Jr.

Summary

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviews John W. Dalton Jr.’s appeal from the denial of postconviction relief. The court affirms the finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal that Dalton did not request, but vacates and remands the disposition of Dalton’s separate ineffective-assistance claim concerning counsel’s failure to investigate. The court also leaves undisturbed the denial of Dalton’s stand-alone excessive-sentence claim as procedurally barred.

Holdings

1. Counsel is not ineffective, and prejudice is not presumed, when the defendant remains silent after being informed of the right to appeal and how to communicate a request for an appeal. That circumstance is not analogous to counsel's ignoring an express directive to file an appeal.
2. A defendant seeking postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice under Strickland v. Washington.
3. When a postconviction motion combines an ineffective-assistance claim seeking a new direct appeal with other ineffective-assistance claims seeking a new trial, the district court must first resolve the direct-appeal claim, enter a final order on that claim alone, and wait for appellate resolution or expiration of the appeal period before resolving the remaining claims.
4. A stand-alone postconviction claim that a sentence is unconstitutionally excessive is procedurally barred when the issue was known and could have been litigated on direct appeal.

Questions Presented

1. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a direct appeal when the defendant had been informed of the right to appeal but had not expressly requested an appeal.
2. Whether the district court properly disposed of other ineffective-assistance postconviction claims before final resolution and mandate concerning the claim seeking a new direct appeal.
3. Whether Dalton's stand-alone claim that his sentences were unconstitutionally excessive was procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings because it could have been raised on direct appeal.

Disposition

other