Summary
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial of James E. Liming’s motion for absolute discharge based on an alleged violation of Nebraska’s statutory speedy-trial requirement. The court held that the period resulting from a settlement-conference continuance granted with defense counsel’s consent was excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b). After counting the excluded periods, the court concluded that Liming’s motion was filed before the adjusted speedy-trial deadline expired.
Holdings
- A period of delay resulting from a continuance of a court-ordered settlement conference is excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b) when the continuance is granted with the consent of the defendant or defense counsel. The statute does not restrict excludable continuances to particular types of proceedings or to continuances that directly postpone a trial date.
- Liming was not entitled to absolute discharge because the applicable excludable periods extended the statutory deadline to November 2, 2019, and he filed his motion for absolute discharge on September 23, 2019.
Questions Presented
- Whether a period of delay resulting from a continuance of a settlement conference, granted at the State's request but with the consent of the defendant's counsel, is excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b).
- Whether, after accounting for all excludable periods, Liming was entitled to absolute discharge because the State failed to bring him to trial within the statutory speedy-trial period.
Disposition
affirmed
Cases Cited (5)
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019)(followed)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (2014)(followed)
- State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797, 587 N.W.2d 384 (1998)(followed)
- State ex rel. Peterson v. Creative Comm. Promotions, 302 Neb. 606, 924 N.W.2d 664 (2019)(followed)
- In re Estate of Radford, 304 Neb. 205, 933 N.W.2d 595 (2019)(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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