Wynn v. Smith

Summary

The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed consolidated appeals arising from Stephen Wynn’s defamation action concerning an advertisement for an unauthorized biography. The court affirmed summary judgment for John L. Smith and the denial of his attorney-fee request, holding that Smith did not publish the advertisement and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reversed the judgment against Barricade Books and Lyle Stuart and remanded for a new trial because the jury received an inaccurate actual-malice instruction; it also held that the fair-report privilege did not apply to the confidential Scotland Yard report.

Holdings

1. A person may not be held liable for defamation for a statement that the person did not write, edit, print, distribute, or otherwise publish.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith attorney fees after considering the applicable Beattie factors, even though it did not make separate explicit findings on each factor.
3. The fair report privilege applies to public, official actions or proceedings, but it does not protect publication of an unauthorized or confidential investigatory report that was not accessible to the public and was not recognized as official.
4. A jury instruction allowing reckless disregard to be found from mere doubt, rather than serious doubt or a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, impermissibly lowers the constitutional actual-malice standard.
5. The advertisement's statement that the book detailed why a confidential Scotland Yard report called Wynn a front man for the Genovese family was ambiguous as to fact versus opinion, so the issue had to be submitted to the jury.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Smith could be held liable for defamation when he did not write, edit, print, distribute, or otherwise publish the allegedly defamatory advertisement.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Smith attorney fees under NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68.
3. Whether the fair report privilege applies to an unauthorized or confidential investigatory report that was not accessible to the public or recognized as official.
4. Whether the jury instruction defining actual malice improperly permitted a finding of reckless disregard based on mere doubt rather than serious doubt.
5. Whether the advertisement's statement was, as a matter of law, non-actionable opinion or instead presented an ambiguous fact-versus-opinion question for the jury.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded