Summary
The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed consolidated appeals arising from a personal injury action involving jury voir dire, juror challenges for cause, expert testimony, medical liens, and cost awards. The court held that questioning prospective jurors about a specific damages amount was not per se improper, but that the district court improperly dismissed five jurors based on potential rather than actual bias; that error was harmless. The court affirmed most rulings, but reversed and remanded the award of expert witness fees exceeding $1,500 per expert because the district court did not state a basis for the award.
Holdings
- Use of a specific damages amount in voir dire is not per se improper and may be permitted to uncover juror bias against large verdicts, but the district court must keep the questioning within reasonable limits. The questioning here did not rise to reversible jury indoctrination, so denial of the mistrial motion was proper.
- Potential bias alone is not a valid basis for dismissing a juror for cause. Jurors' statements must be considered as a whole, and dismissal requires actual bias that prevents or substantially impairs the juror's ability to apply the law and instructions. The district court abused its discretion by dismissing the five jurors after they had indicated they could follow the law and award large verdicts.
- The district court's improper dismissal of the five jurors was harmless and did not warrant reversal because Khoury received a trial before a competent and unbiased jury.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Muir's opinion concerning the adequacy of Dr. Belsky's workup because the opinion was formed during the course of Muir's treatment of Seastrand.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Gross's opinion that Seastrand's pre-accident symptoms were unrelated to her neck and more likely related to her heart or anxiety. The opinion was within his specialized neurological knowledge and was disclosed in a supplemental expert report.
- Evidence of the amount a third party paid to purchase Seastrand's medical liens was irrelevant to the reasonable value of the medical services and was properly excluded.
- Evidence of the existence of medical liens is admissible to prove bias by medical providers and does not implicate Nevada's collateral-source rule. The district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence, but the error was harmless.
- The isolated use of the word claim in opening argument did not inform the jury that Khoury had insurance and did not warrant a mistrial or new trial.
- A district court may award more than $1,500 per expert witness under NRS 18.005(5), but it must state the basis for finding that the circumstances required the larger fee. The district court abused its discretion by awarding excess expert fees without stating a basis.
Questions Presented
- Whether questioning prospective jurors about a specific $2 million damages amount constituted per se jury indoctrination or warranted a mistrial.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing five prospective jurors for cause based on statements concerning large verdicts and pain-and-suffering damages.
- Whether any error in dismissing the five jurors was prejudicial.
- Whether the district court properly admitted treating physician Dr. Muir's opinion concerning another physician's workup and treatment.
- Whether the district court properly admitted neurological expert Dr. Gross's testimony concerning Seastrand's pre-accident symptoms and whether that testimony was within his specialized knowledge and disclosed in a supplemental report.
- Whether evidence of the amount paid by a third party to purchase Seastrand's medical liens was admissible to establish the reasonable value of medical services.
- Whether evidence of the existence of medical liens was admissible to establish bias by Seastrand's medical providers.
- Whether Seastrand's isolated use of the word claim in opening argument warranted a mistrial or new trial.
- Whether the district court properly awarded expert witness fees exceeding $1,500 per expert without stating the basis for the excess award.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (27)
- Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. 424, 254 P.3d 623 (2011)(distinguished)
- Owens v. State, 96 Nev. 880, 620 P.2d 1236 (1980)(followed)
- Lamb v. State, 127 Nev. 26, 251 P.3d 700 (2011)(followed)
- Scully v. Otis Elevator Co., 275 N.E.2d 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)(persuasive)
- Hogan v. State, 103 Nev. 21, 732 P.2d 422 (1987)(persuasive)
- Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 148 P.3d 767 (2006)(persuasive)
- Kinsey v. Kolber, 431 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)(persuasive)
- Trautman v. New Rockford-Fessenden Co-op. Transportation Ass'n, 181 N.W.2d 754 (N.D. 1970)(distinguished)
- Henthorn v. Long, 122 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1961)(distinguished)
- Sanders v. Sears-Page, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 50, 354 P.3d 201 (Ct. App. 2015)(followed)
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