Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte

Summary

The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the reclassification of property owned by the Jicarilla Apache Nation from agricultural to miscellaneous non-residential for property-tax purposes. The court held that the county assessor and valuation protests board reasonably relied on the Taxation and Revenue Department’s determination that elk were not livestock under the Property Tax Code. It also upheld the board’s conclusion that the property’s conservation agreement did not establish a qualifying primary agricultural use.

Holdings

1. The 1981 amendment adding classification to NMSA 1978, Section 7-38-6, statutorily overruled Black v. Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board to the extent Black held that the assessor and Board lacked the statutory presumption of correctness in determining entitlement to agricultural valuation. The Board reasonably reconciled the competing presumptions by requiring the assessor initially to show that the prior classification was changed or erroneous, after which the assessor received the presumption of correctness.
2. When property has multiple uses, a comparison of income from agricultural and nonagricultural uses may reasonably serve as a proxy for determining which use is primary, and the regulatory presumption favoring the higher-income use is rebuttable rather than conclusive.
3. The Board properly deferred to the Division's reasonable categorical determination that elk are not livestock under the Property Tax Code. The private elk herd was not livestock despite some indicia of domestication, and the public elk herd was also not livestock.
4. The Lodge's USDA agreement was a valid soil conservation agreement under NMSA 1978, Section 7-36-20(B), even though it also served the purpose of developing and maintaining elk habitat.
5. A valid soil conservation agreement establishes an agricultural-use element but does not, by itself, establish that agricultural use is the primary use of the property. The Board properly found that commercial hunting, rather than compliance with the conservation agreement, was the primary use of the uplands.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the assessor and valuation protests board properly treated elk as not constituting livestock under the Property Tax Code for purposes of agricultural property classification.
2. Whether the Division of Taxation and Revenue's determination that elk were not livestock was entitled to deference.
3. Whether the Board properly reconciled the statutory presumption favoring continued agricultural classification with the statutory presumption that the assessor's classification is correct.
4. Whether the USDA conservation agreement qualified as a soil conservation agreement under NMSA 1978, Section 7-36-20(B).
5. Whether the existence of the conservation agreement alone established that the property was primarily used for agricultural purposes.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded