Summary
The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed an order granting plaintiffs summary judgment on liability in a rear-end collision case and denied the motion. The court held that the defendant raised a triable issue of fact through testimony supporting a nonnegligent explanation and the emergency doctrine, despite not having pleaded that doctrine as an affirmative defense.
Holdings
- Although plaintiffs established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment based on the rear-end collision, Jakubcin raised a triable issue of fact by offering a nonnegligent explanation that plaintiffs' vehicle abruptly stopped in the center lane after being concealed from her view by a box truck.
- Jakubcin was not precluded from raising the emergency doctrine in opposition to plaintiffs' summary judgment motion even though she had not pleaded it as an affirmative defense.
Questions Presented
- Whether plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on liability based on evidence that Jakubcin rear-ended their vehicle.
- Whether Jakubcin raised a triable issue of fact by offering a nonnegligent explanation for the collision.
- Whether Jakubcin could raise the emergency doctrine in opposition to plaintiffs' summary judgment motion despite not pleading it as an affirmative defense.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (3)
- Romero v. Valdez, 198 A.D.3d 496, 497 (1st Dep't 2021), lv dismissed, 37 N.Y.3d 1232 (2022)(followed)
- Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908 (2008)(followed)
- Richards v. Mitchell, 172 A.D.3d 439, 439-440 (1st Dep't 2019)(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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