People v. Granger

Summary

The court considered a reargument of an appeal from the defendant’s speeding conviction. It held that the prosecution failed to prove that no greater speed was permitted on the county highway and that the statutory presumption for state highways was inapplicable; the conviction was therefore reversed on the law and the facts.

Holdings

1. The statutory presumption concerning the absence of signs permitting a greater speed applied only to state highways outside cities or incorporated villages and did not apply to Veteran's Highway because it was a county highway.
2. Because the presumption did not apply, the prosecution was required to prove that no greater speed had been permitted by the State Traffic Commission, and its failure to offer that proof required reversal.
3. The then-effective version of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 95-c could not be construed to clearly deny the State Traffic Commission power to set a speed greater than fifty miles per hour on county and town roads.
4. The defendant's status as a probation officer and alleged peace officer did not require the prosecution to negate the official-duty exception unless the defendant first raised the matter as a defense.
5. The evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction, and the conviction was reversed on both the law and the facts.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the statutory presumption concerning the absence of a greater speed limit applied to a county highway rather than a state highway.
2. Whether the prosecution was required to prove that no greater speed had been permitted by the State Traffic Commission on the county highway.
3. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the speeding conviction.
4. Whether the defendant's status as a probation officer required the prosecution to prove that she was not engaged in official duties under the law-enforcement-officer exception.

Disposition

reversed