Summary
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed an order granting the defendants summary judgment in a personal-injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident. The court held that the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding serious injuries under Insurance Law § 5102(d), and that the defendants' expert's causation concession eliminated the need for the plaintiff to address causation or a gap in treatment.
Holdings
- Although the defendants met their prima facie burden of establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d), the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact in opposition. Summary judgment dismissing the complaint was therefore improper.
- Because the defendants' expert conceded that the alleged cervical and lumbar injuries were caused by the accident, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue regarding causation or explain any gap in treatment.
Questions Presented
- Whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).
- Whether the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding serious injury and whether the defendants' concession regarding causation eliminated any need for the plaintiff to establish causation or explain a gap in treatment.
Disposition
reversed
Cases Cited (6)
- Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345(followed)
- Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957(followed)
- Staff v. Yshua, 59 AD3d 614(followed)
- Perl v. Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218(followed)
- Pommells v. Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572(followed)
- Cortez v. Nugent, 175 AD3d 1383, 1384(followed)
Cited In (0)
No citing cases on record yet.
Court Document
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