State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610

Summary

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed Christopher Edward Goss's first-degree murder conviction and death sentence for the killing of Deborah Sturgill Veler. The court addressed, among other issues, the reopening of voir dire, the defendant's right to consult counsel during a psychiatric evaluation, and whether defense counsel's closing argument improperly conceded guilt. The excerpt concludes while analyzing the alleged concession under North Carolina's Harbison doctrine.

Holdings

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by reopening voir dire of prospective jurors Brown and Dancy after learning that they had relatives who had been criminal defendants.
2. Defendant's constitutional challenge to the order barring consultation with counsel during the psychiatric evaluation was waived and dismissed because defendant failed to object at trial and failed to assign plain error.
3. Defense counsel's reference to the consequences of a first-degree murder conviction did not constitute Harbison error or an unauthorized concession of guilt.
4. The trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor's argument because any possible prejudice was cured by the jury instructions limiting the evidence's use.
5. The challenged capital-sentencing instructions were proper under controlling North Carolina precedent, the aggravating circumstances were supported by the evidence, and the death sentence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by reopening voir dire of two prospective jurors who had failed to disclose relatives with criminal convictions.
2. Whether the trial court's order barring defendant from consulting with counsel during a mid-trial psychiatric evaluation violated his constitutional right to counsel, and whether the issue was preserved.
3. Whether defense counsel's statement during closing argument constituted an unauthorized concession of guilt under State v. Harbison.
4. Whether the prosecutor's closing argument concerning defendant's assault of a jail informant was grossly improper and required ex mero motu intervention.
5. Whether the trial court's capital-sentencing instructions regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances violated applicable law or constitutional rights.
6. Whether the evidence supported the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and whether the death sentence was imposed under passion, prejudice, or an arbitrary factor.
7. Whether defendant's death sentence was disproportionate to the crime and similar cases.

Disposition

affirmed