M.E. v. T.J.

Summary

The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over M.E.'s Chapter 50B domestic violence protective order action despite her amended notice of voluntary dismissal. The court also held that M.E.'s constitutional argument was preserved and that the defendant's necessary-joinder argument was not preserved. The court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision; the Court of Appeals' ruling that the statutory exclusion of complainants in same-sex dating relationships was unconstitutional remained undisturbed.

Holdings

1. The district court acted within its broad discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the Chapter 50B complaint because plaintiff's amended notice of voluntary dismissal functionally served as a Rule 60(b) motion for equitable relief and her later amendment to the complaint functionally served as a refiling.
2. Plaintiff properly preserved her constitutional argument for appellate review under Rule 10(a)(1).
3. Defendant's Rule 19(d) necessary-joinder argument was not properly before the Supreme Court because it was not raised in the trial court or Court of Appeals and was first raised by the Court of Appeals dissent.
4. Even assuming the joinder issue could be raised for the first time on appeal, Rule 19(d) did not require joinder because plaintiff brought a Chapter 50B action seeking a DVPO and raised the constitutional issue as an as-applied defense to dismissal, not as a facial action challenging the statute's validity.
5. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Court of Appeals' ruling that Chapter 50B's exclusion of complainants in same-sex dating relationships from DVPO protection was unconstitutional; that ruling remained undisturbed and retained its normal precedential effect.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with M.E.'s Chapter 50B DVPO complaint after she filed and promptly amended a notice of voluntary dismissal.
2. Whether M.E. properly preserved for appellate review her constitutional challenge to the exclusion of same-sex dating relationships from Chapter 50B protection.
3. Whether defendant's argument that legislative leaders were necessary parties under N.C. Rule 19(d) was preserved and meritorious.
4. Whether the Court of Appeals' substantive ruling that the Chapter 50B exclusion of complainants in same-sex dating relationships was unconstitutional should be disturbed.

Disposition

affirmed