Hawes v. North Dakota Department of Transportation; State v. Hawes

Summary

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed Hawes's criminal conviction for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence and the suspension of her driving privileges by the North Dakota Department of Transportation. The court held that the jury instruction was not reversible error, the prosecutor's closing argument did not constitute obvious error, and the Department's decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Holdings

1. The jury instruction was not reversible error because, considered as a whole and in the context of the evidence, it fairly informed the jury that it had to decide whether the vehicle was operable or could have been made operable while Hawes remained intoxicated.
2. Intent to operate a motor vehicle is not an element of the offense of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence.
3. A vehicle that has run out of gas is not inoperable as a matter of law; whether it was operable or could have been made operable while the defendant remained intoxicated is a fact question.
4. The prosecutor's comments were not reversible obvious error because Hawes did not object, the meaning of the term was not shown to have been understood by the jury, and the record did not establish that the comments affected the jury's ability to fairly judge the evidence.
5. The Department's conclusion that Hawes was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was affirmed.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the jury instruction defining operability and actual physical control fairly and adequately stated North Dakota law.
2. Whether the prosecutor's use of the terms "Balderdash" and "Smoke and mirrors" during rebuttal closing argument constituted obvious error affecting Hawes's substantial rights.
3. Whether the Department of Transportation's determination that Hawes was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Whether a vehicle that has run out of gas is inoperable as a matter of law for purposes of the actual-physical-control offense.

Disposition

affirmed