City of Bismarck v. Daniel J. McCormick

2012 ND 53 · Supreme Court of North Dakota · March 15, 2012 · No. 20110239

Summary

The North Dakota Supreme Court held that a district court order granting a post-trial judgment of acquittal based on the court's legal conclusion about judicial notice of a municipal ordinance was appealable as an order quashing an information. The Court further held that the defendant's post-verdict motion was timely under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) and that the district court could freely take judicial notice of the city ordinance as a legislative fact. The order was reversed and the matter remanded.

Holdings

  1. The order granting judgment of acquittal was properly treated as an order quashing an information, rather than as a judgment of acquittal, because it rested on a legal conclusion and did not resolve factual elements of the charged offense. The City therefore had a statutory right to appeal.
  2. McCormick's motion for judgment of acquittal was timely because it was filed three days after the guilty verdict, within the fourteen-day period allowed by N.D.R.Crim.P. 29(c). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion timely.
  3. A district court may freely take judicial notice of a city ordinance when a municipal-court matter is transferred to district court for a jury trial. N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1 does not prohibit judicial notice merely because it lacks the express judicial-notice language contained in N.D.C.C. § 40-18-19.
  4. Keyes v. Amundson did not control the issue because its statement that a municipal ordinance must be introduced into evidence or stipulated to was dictum, not necessary to the decision in that case.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court's post-trial order granting judgment of acquittal was an appealable order quashing an information or a nonappealable judgment of acquittal.
  2. Whether McCormick's post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal was timely under the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  3. Whether a district court may take judicial notice of a city ordinance when a municipal-court matter is transferred to district court for a jury trial under N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1.
  4. Whether the prior statements in Keyes v. Amundson concerning judicial notice of municipal ordinances were controlling precedent.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (10)

  • City of Dickinson v. Kraft, 472 N.W.2d 441, 442 (N.D. 1991)(followed)
  • State v. Deutscher, 2009 ND 98, ¶ 6, 766 N.W.2d 442(followed)
  • State v. Erickson, 2011 ND 49, ¶ 7, 795 N.W.2d 375(followed)
  • Brakke v. Brakke, 525 N.W.2d 687, 689 (N.D. 1994)(followed)
  • Nelson v. Johnson, 2010 ND 23, ¶ 12, 778 N.W.2d 773(followed)
  • State v. Velasquez, 1999 ND 217, ¶ 4, 602 N.W.2d 693(followed)
  • Aggie Investments GP v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 470 N.W.2d 805, 811 (N.D. 1991)(followed)
  • Keyes v. Amundson, 391 N.W.2d 602, 604, 607-08 (N.D. 1986)(distinguished)
  • Bakke v. St. Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 43, 359 N.W.2d 117, 120 (N.D. 1984)(followed)
  • First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Scherle, 356 N.W.2d 894, 897 (N.D. 1984)(followed)

Cited In (0)

No citing cases on record yet.

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