State v. Jones

Summary

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Mike Jones's untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief and his motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. The court addressed the statutory requirements for untimely or successive postconviction petitions, the Crim.R. 33(B) standard for newly discovered evidence, and Jones's claims concerning alleged Brady suppression and newly identified witness evidence.

Holdings

1. A court may entertain an untimely or successive postconviction petition only if the petitioner satisfies the exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A), including showing that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts on which the claim relies and, where applicable, showing by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty absent constitutional error.
2. In an untimely or successive postconviction petition asserting a Brady claim, the petitioner may satisfy the unavoidably-prevented requirement by establishing that the prosecution suppressed the evidence, but the petitioner still bears the burden of proving suppression.
3. The interoffice memorandum was protected prosecutorial work product, was not evidence that the State was required to disclose, and did not establish a Brady violation.
4. Even assuming the memorandum had been suppressed, Jones failed to show that it was material under Brady or that it undermined confidence in the verdict.
5. A petitioner cannot circumvent the unavoidably-prevented requirement for an untimely or successive postconviction petition by arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing to use evidence that counsel allegedly possessed.
6. The Taylor affidavit did not establish that Jones was unavoidably prevented from discovering her identity or proposed testimony, and its contents did not satisfy the additional requirement that no reasonable factfinder would have found Jones guilty.
7. The trial court properly denied Jones's motion for leave under Crim.R. 33(B) because the unavoidably-prevented requirement mirrors the requirement applicable to an untimely or successive postconviction petition, and a hearing would have been futile.
8. Res judicata barred Jones's ineffective-assistance arguments that could have been raised on direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition; the remaining res judicata issue was moot in light of the disposition of the other assignments of error.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Jones's untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).
2. Whether Jones established that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the interoffice memorandum or Taylor's proposed testimony.
3. Whether the interoffice memorandum established a Brady violation or was discoverable evidence rather than protected prosecutorial work product.
4. Whether Jones could avoid the unavoidably-prevented requirement by recasting his claim as ineffective assistance of counsel.
5. Whether the trial court properly denied leave to file an untimely motion for new trial under Crim.R. 33(B).
6. Whether res judicata barred Jones's ineffective-assistance arguments.

Disposition

affirmed