Bright v. Mao

Summary

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed a Greene County Domestic Relations Division judgment granting a divorce, adopting portions of the parties’ separation agreement, allocating parental rights, and ordering child support. The court held that res judicata barred challenges to the prior separation judgment and that the appellant could not obtain state-funded transcripts for this civil divorce appeal. The court also rejected arguments concerning federal immigration-sponsorship obligations, the separation agreement, and prior orders not properly before the court.

Holdings

1. Res judicata barred Mao from relitigating whether the 2019 judgment adopting the separation agreement was void because Mao had previously raised the relevant allegations in a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, appealed the denial, and failed to prosecute that appeal.
2. The trial court's incorporation of portions of the 2019 separation agreement did not render the divorce decree void.
3. Arguments concerning the 2018 emergency temporary-custody order and the January 3, 2022 contempt order were not properly before the appellate court.
4. An indigent civil litigant appealing a divorce judgment is not constitutionally entitled to a trial transcript at state expense.
5. The appellate court could not consider an alleged trial-court order entered after the notice of appeal.

Questions Presented

1. Whether res judicata barred Mao from arguing that the 2019 judgment of legal separation and incorporated separation agreement were void because of alleged duress, coercion, misrepresentation, fraud, or conflict with federal law.
2. Whether the trial court's incorporation of portions of the separation agreement rendered the divorce decree void.
3. Whether challenges to an interlocutory emergency temporary-custody order and an unappealed contempt order were properly before the appellate court.
4. Whether Mao was entitled to a transcript of the final divorce hearing at state expense and whether the alleged denial of such a transcript violated due process.
5. Whether the appellate court could consider an alleged trial-court order entered after the notice of appeal.

Disposition

affirmed